CLAT PG Mock Legal Practice Questions January 2025

Legal Bites brings you the CLAT PG Mock Legal Practice Questions – January 2025, designed to help you refine your preparation strategy and boost your legal aptitude. With the rising competition and evolving exam patterns, consistent practice with quality questions is essential to stay ahead.

These mock questions closely simulate the actual CLAT PG exam, allowing you to familiarise yourself with the structure, question types, and level of difficulty. Regular practice will not only reinforce your conceptual clarity but also enhance your speed, accuracy, and confidence. The mock paper also provides an opportunity for self-assessment, helping you identify strengths and improve on weak areas.

All case extracts and questions in this mock test are drawn from the most important Supreme Court and High Court judgments delivered in January 2025.

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CLAT PG Mock Legal Practice Questions
January 2025

No. of questions: 120

I. The Appellant has submitted before us that such an undertaking stands grossly unfulfilled, and in her petition under Section 23, it has been averred that there is a breakdown of peaceful relations inter se the parties. In such a situation, the two conditions mentioned in Sudesh (supra) must be appropriately interpreted to further the beneficial nature of the legislation and not strictly which would render otiose the intent of the legislature. Therefore, the Single Judge of the High Court and the tribunals below had rightly held the Gift Deed to be cancelled since the conditions for the well-being of the senior citizens were not complied with. We are unable to agree with the view taken by the Division Bench, because it takes a strict view of a beneficial legislation.

Before parting with the case at hand, we must clarify the observations made vide the impugned order qua the competency of the Tribunal to hand over possession of the property. In S. Vanitha (supra), this Court observed that Tribunals under the Act may order eviction if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the protection of the senior citizen. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Tribunals constituted under the Act, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 23, cannot order possession to be transferred. This would defeat the purpose and object of the Act, which is to provide speedy, simple and inexpensive remedies for the elderly.

(This extract is taken from Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 10927 of 2024)

1. Which section of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 was central to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit?

A. Section 20

B. Section 22

C. Section 23

D. Section 25

2. What interpretative principle did the Court emphasise when construing provisions of the Act?

A. Literal interpretation

B. Strict construction

C. Beneficial and purposive interpretation

D. Doctrinal interpretation

3. What was the Division Bench’s main reasoning in overturning the Single Judge’s decision?

A. The gift deed was found to be forged.

B. The gift deed had no express clause requiring maintenance.

C. There was no written agreement for maintenance.

D. The Tribunal had no jurisdiction over such matters.

4. According to the judgment, which of the following is NOT a function of the Tribunal under the Act?

A. Awarding imprisonment for failure to maintain

B. Restoring possession of property to the senior citizen

C. Declaring a gift deed void for non-maintenance

D. Enforcing conditions implied in property transfer

5. Which of the following best captures the object of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, as noted by the Court?

A. To protect parental property from misuse by government

B. To reduce judicial workload through summary trials

C. To regulate inheritance among family members

D. To ensure easy, inexpensive, and speedy redress for elder neglect

II. Though the 2000 Act was already enacted before the Appellant’s conviction, even assuming that only the 1986 Act was in vogue, the procedural mandate contemplated thereunder was also not followed by the trial Court and the High Court. Before this Court, the Appellant had relied upon the school certificate in the Criminal Appeal. It was once again relied upon in the Review Petition. Thereafter, additional documents were relied upon by the Appellant in the Writ Petition and also in the Curative Petition which was subsequently filed. In the Curative Petition, a counter affidavit was filed by the State certifying the documents furnished by the Appellant to be true. Nonetheless, the said petition was dismissed without according any reason.

In the subsequent Writ Petition filed before the High Court, two different prayers had been made, namely, the determination of the Appellant’s plea of juvenility and consequent release, or alternatively, judicial review of the decision of the President or the Governor and consequent release. As the Executive cannot be construed to have undertaken an adjudication on the determination of the age of the accused, and with the first prayer being a distinct one invoking Section 9(2) of the 2015 Act, we feel that the High Court has committed an error in its reasoning. We would only state that this is a case where the Appellant has been suffering due to the error committed by the Courts. We have been informed that his conduct in the prison is normal, with no adverse report. He lost an opportunity to reintegrate into the society. The time which he has lost, for no fault of his, can never be restored.

(This extract is taken from Om Prakash @ Israel @ Raju @ Raju Das v. Union of India & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 4229 OF 2024)

6. According to the Supreme Court in Om Prakash v. Union of India (2025), which provision allows raising the plea of juvenility at any stage of the legal proceedings?

A. Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015

B. Section 9(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015

C. Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000

D. Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000

7. Which constitutional principle guided the Court to act in a parental role for juveniles in conflict with law?

A. Rule of Law

B. Parens Patriae

C. Res Judicata

D. Autrefois Acquit

8. What is the hierarchy of documents prescribed for determining age under Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007?

A. Medical opinion first, then school certificate

B. Birth certificate, then medical opinion

C. Matriculation certificate, then school certificate, then birth certificate, then medical opinion

D. Police report, school record, medical opinion

9. Which of the following is NOT a valid ground for judicial review of a Presidential Order under Article 72, as discussed in the judgment?

A. Delay in decision

B. Inadequate application of mind

C. Change in public opinion

D. Arbitrary decision-making

10. What was the final direction of the Supreme Court regarding the sentence of the appellant in Om Prakash v. Union of India (2025)?

A. The death sentence was upheld

B. Conviction was overturned

C. Sentence in excess of juvenile law was set aside, but conviction maintained

D. Retrial was ordered

III. Our reading of Rule 10 of the KS SSR, as originally framed in 1958, together with the amendments incorporated in it from time to time, including Rule 10(ab), leads us to the irresistible conclusion that Rule 10 is entirely irrelevant and immaterial for appointment on promotion in the Administrative and Teaching Cadres of the Medical Education Services. The recruitment rules with which we are concerned, i.e., G.O. dated 07th April, 2008, was issued at a point of time when Rule 10(ab) had already found its way in the KS and SSR by an amendment. G.O. dated 07th April, 2008 was issued superseding all existing rules and orders in force on the method of appointment of the faculties under medical education service. The executive must, therefore, be deemed to be aware of what the KS and SSR, which are the general rules, provided. Notwithstanding the same, G.O. dated 07th April, 2008 was issued governing recruitment in two branches i.e. Administrative and Teaching Cadres. G.O. dated 07th April, 2008 is, thus, a special rule as distinguished from a general rule like the KS and SSR. Rule 10(ab), on its own showing, having referred to the expression “unless otherwise specified”, the same has to be given some meaning or else it would be rendered redundant. It is well settled that no word, no phrase and no expression used in a legislation should be excluded as surplusage, while the courts embark on a course of interpretation. In our reading, the distinction in the qualifications for posts in Branch-I and Branch-II in G.O. dated 07th April, 2008 would constitute the specification which is excluded from the purview of Rule 10(ab) and such rule had/has no application to the promotional appointment in question. The Tribunal was quite right in its observation.

(This extract is taken from Dr. Sharmad v. State of Kerala & Ors., 2025 INSC 70).

11. What did the Supreme Court conclude about the applicability of Rule 10 of the KS&SSR in the context of medical education promotions?

A. Rule 10 is fully applicable to all appointments

B. Rule 10 is partially applicable to teaching cadre only

C. Rule 10 is irrelevant and immaterial for promotional appointments

D. Rule 10 overrides executive orders like the G.O. of 2008

12. What is the legal significance of the phrase “unless otherwise specified” as used in Rule 10(ab), according to the Court?

A. It has no legal consequence

B. It allows courts to ignore executive orders

C. It enables specific rules like the G.O. 2008 to override general rules

D. It supports retrospective application of rules

13. How did the Court distinguish between the G.O. dated 07 April 2008 and Rule 10(ab) of the KS&SSR?

A. Both were treated as general rules

B. G.O. was treated as subordinate to Rule 10(ab)

C. Rule 10(ab) was repealed by the G.O.

D. G.O. was a special rule overriding the general rule

14. According to the passage, what interpretive principle must courts follow when dealing with legislative language?

A. Courts may ignore surplus expressions

B. Courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and expression

C. Courts should prefer executive intent over statutory text

D. Courts must only focus on headings and preambles

15. What assumption did the Court make about the executive while issuing the G.O. dated 07 April 2008?

A. That it was unaware of the KS&SSR rules

B. That it intended to create confusion in eligibility

C. That it was aware of the general rules and intentionally created a special rule

D. That it meant to revoke all forms of experience-based eligibility

IV. The right to live with a partner of one's choice is a necessary component of the right to life and personal liberty, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Apex Court on several occasions has held that live-in-relationships are not illegal. In S. Khushboo vs. Kanniammal and Anr. reported in 2010 (5) SCC 600, it has been held that living together is an aspect of the right to life and personal liberty. In Indra Sarma vs. V.K.V. Sarma reported in 2013 (15) SCC 755, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that 'Live-in or marriage like relationship' is neither a crime nor a sin, though socially unacceptable in our country. The decision to marry or not to marry or to have a heterosexual relationship is immensely personal. Similarly, in the case of Lata Singh vs. State of UP and Anr. reported in 2006 (5) SCC 475, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that a live-in-relationship between two consenting adults of heterosexual sex does not amount to any offence, even though it may be perceived as immoral.

(This extract is taken from the judgment in Reena & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 2183/2024)

16. What is the constitutional provision primarily relied upon to uphold the right to live in a live-in relationship?

A. Article 19

B. Article 15

C. Article 25

D. Article 21

17. In which landmark case did the Supreme Court observe that a live-in relationship is “neither a crime nor a sin”?

A. Lata Singh v. State of UP

B. Joseph Shine v. Union of India

C. Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma

D. S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal

18. Which case struck down Section 497 IPC (adultery) as unconstitutional?

A. Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma

B. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India

C. Joseph Shine v. Union of India

D. Lata Singh v. State of UP

19. What legislative development was cited as a model for live-in relationships?

A. Maharashtra Domestic Relationship Act, 2023

B. Special Marriage Rules (Live-In Regulations), 2024

C. Uniform Civil Code of Uttarakhand, 2024

D. Marriage and Cohabitation Ordinance, 2024

20. What legislative recommendation did the Rajasthan High Court make regarding live-in relationships?

A. Ban all live-in relationships involving minors

B. Enact a law similar to the Uniform Civil Code of Uttarakhand to regulate live-in relationships

C. Penalize live-in relationships as adultery

D. Automatically convert all long-term live-in relationships into marriages

V. Section 301 of the IPC, reads thus:

‘301. Culpable homicide by causing death of person other than person whose death was intended.—If a person, by doing anything which he intends or knows to be likely to cause death, commits culpable homicide by causing the death of any person, whose death he neither intends nor knows himself to be likely to cause, the culpable homicide committed by the offender is of the description of which it would have been if he had caused the death of the person whose death he intended or knew himself to be likely to cause.’

From the perusal of the provision of Section 301 of the IPC, it becomes manifest that Section 301 embodies what the English authors describe as the doctrine of transfer of malice or the transmigration of motive. Under the Section, if A intends to kill B, but kills C whose death he neither intends nor knows himself to be likely to cause, the intention to kill C is by law attributed to him...

(This extract is taken from Ashok Saxena v. State of Uttarakhand, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1704–1705 of 2015)

21. What legal doctrine under Section 301 IPC was discussed in the judgment?

A. Doctrine of Double Jeopardy

B. Doctrine of Last Seen

C. Doctrine of Transmigration of Motive / Transfer of Malice

D. Doctrine of Common Intention

22. Which section of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, corresponds to Section 301 of the IPC?

A. Section 101

B. Section 103

C. Section 102

D. Section 105

23. In which of the following situations does Section 301 IPC apply?

A. Person A tries to poison himself and kills B accidentally

B. Person A aims to shoot B but mistakenly kills C

C. Person A insults B and B dies of shock

D. Person A drives negligently and kills a pedestrian

24. Which of the following cases did not involve the doctrine of transferred malice?

A. Gyanendra Kumar v. State of U.P.

B. R v. Latimer

C. State of M.P. v. Shyamsunder Trivedi

D. Jagpal Singh v. State of Punjab

25. In the case of Ashok Saxena, who was the actual victim?

A. The complainant's son

B. The intended victim

C. The complainant’s wife

D. A bystander

VI. The case in hand is a glaring example of casualness on the part of the State Authorities while dealing with the litigation. The issue could be resolved at the very first stage when a representation was made by the petitioner seeking promotion to the post of Tracer way back in the year 1991. The chapter could have been closed merely while responding to the same while referring to the relevant statutory 1979 Rules. To some extent it was done but false hopes are created in the minds of employees if some other similarly situated are granted the benefit, which itself is contrary to the Rules.

The letters continued flowing from the petitioner to the respondent, and from one department to another as a shuttlecock, as if there is no other constructive work to do. Even before the Tribunal, the petitioner had three rounds of litigation followed by one Writ Petition before the High Court by the State and thereafter this Court. At none of these stages, the relevant statutory 1979 Rules were referred to either in the counter or in the petition. Such conduct is not expected from the State which is the major litigant and the case in hand is an example of unnecessary generation of litigation by the State where the authorities need to circumspect and be more careful.

(This extract is taken from Jyostnamayee Mishra v. State of Odisha & Ors., 2025 INSC 87)

26. What was the Supreme Court’s main concern regarding the conduct of the State authorities in Jyostnamayee Mishra v. State of Odisha & Ors.?

A. They refused to promote the petitioner based on caste.

B. They failed to file an appeal on time.

C. They failed to cite the relevant statutory rules throughout prolonged litigation.

D. They denied maternity leave to the petitioner without justification.

27. According to the 1979 Rules as interpreted by the Court, the post of "Tracer" in Odisha's Subordinate Architectural Service is to be filled through:

A. 50% direct recruitment and 50% promotion

B. 100% promotion from Peons

C. 100% direct recruitment

D. Compassionate appointment only

28. In Jyostnamayee Mishra, the petitioner sought promotion to which post?

A. Head Draftsman

B. Assistant Engineer

C. Tracer

D. Section Officer

29. Which constitutional article did the Supreme Court refer to while rejecting the argument of negative equality in this case?

A. Article 14

B. Article 16

C. Article 21

D. Article 309

30. Which of the following best describes the doctrine rejected by the Court while denying relief to the petitioner based on past illegal promotions?

A. Doctrine of Severability

B. Doctrine of Casus Omissus

C. Doctrine of Negative Equality

D. Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation

VII. The existence of bonded labour in any form, whether traditional or modern, is an affront to human dignity and a clear violation of constitutional rights under Articles 21 and 23. Despite decades of legislation and judicial pronouncements, the persistence of such exploitative conditions is indicative of systemic apathy, lack of effective enforcement, and the invisibility of the most marginalised communities in policy discourse.

The Court cannot remain a passive observer when the fundamental rights of citizens are being violated on such a scale. A proactive and compassionate judiciary is not only within the constitutional scheme but is, in fact, its very essence. Article 32 is a powerful tool for the protection of these rights and must be activated meaningfully. Courts must adopt a rights-based approach when interpreting and applying labour welfare statutes, especially where the affected populations lack bargaining power or access to legal remedies.

(This extract is taken from National Campaign Committee for Eradication of Bonded Labour v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 104)

31. Which Articles of the Constitution are directly invoked in the above passage to highlight the illegality of bonded labour?

A. Articles 14 and 15

B. Articles 16 and 39

C. Articles 19 and 32

D. Articles 21 and 23

32. According to the passage, what is the judiciary’s constitutional role when fundamental rights are being violated on a mass scale?

A. To defer the matter to Parliament

B. To issue directions only after a fact-finding inquiry

C. To respect the policy domain of the executive

D. To act as a proactive and compassionate institution

33. What key reason does the Court attribute to the continued existence of bonded labour, despite laws and judgments?

A. Judicial overreach

B. Structural apathy and poor enforcement

C. Budgetary constraints of the State

D. Conflicting labour laws

34. The judgment refers to Article 32 in the context of:

A. Legislative immunity

B. Judicial restraint in economic matters

C. Enforcement of fundamental rights

D. Doctrine of basic structure

35. What interpretive lens does the Court advise while dealing with labour welfare statutes?

A. Strict construction

B. Doctrinal consistency

C. Rights-based approach

D. Precedent-bound literalism

VIII. This Court is constrained to observe that there is no justification whatsoever for the Trial Court to have issued bailable warrants in an application filed under the provisions of the D.V. Act. The proceedings under the D.V. Act are quasi-criminal proceedings which do not have any penal consequence except where there is a violation or breach of a protection order. Therefore, the learned Magistrate was absolutely unjustified in directing issuance of bailable warrants against the petitioner.

Having considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner and after going through the material available on record and considering the fact that the proceedings of the divorce petition filed by the husband of the petitioner have already been transferred by this Court from Family Court, West, Tis Hazari, New Delhi to Family Court, Ludhiana District Court, Punjab vide order dated 14.08.2024 passed in Transfer Petition(Civil) No. 1506 of 2024, the instant transfer petition stands allowed in the terms prayed for.

(This extract is taken from Alisha Berry v. Neelam Berry, Transfer Petition (Crl.) No. 856/2024)

36. What type of proceedings are cases filed under the Domestic Violence Act (D.V. Act), as observed in the above passage?

A. Strictly civil proceedings

B. Strictly criminal proceedings

C. Quasi-criminal proceedings

D. Summary criminal proceedings

37. According to the Supreme Court’s observation in this case, bailable warrants:

A. Are mandatory in all D.V. Act proceedings

B. May be issued only after conviction

C. Were unjustified in the given circumstances

D. Can be issued ex parte in family matters

38. Which legal misstep by the Trial Court prompted the Supreme Court’s intervention?

A. Transferring the case without consent of parties

B. Failing to record evidence before trial

C. Issuing bailable warrants inappropriately

D. Ignoring interim maintenance requests

39. Under the D.V. Act, penal consequences arise only when:

A. The initial complaint is withdrawn

B. A protection order is violated

C. The magistrate directs an arrest

D. Maintenance is unpaid for more than six months

40. What procedural remedy did the petitioner successfully seek from the Supreme Court?

A. Quashing of FIR

B. Grant of anticipatory bail

C. Stay on bailable warrants

D. Transfer of the D.V. Act case to Ludhiana

IX. The provision made in Section 162 for framing a scheme for providing cashless treatment in the golden hour seeks to uphold and protect the right to life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. Moreover, it is a statutory obligation of the Central Government to frame the scheme. More than reasonable time was available to the Central Government to frame the scheme under Sub-Section (2) of Section 162. Once the scheme is framed and its implementation starts, it will save the lives of several injured persons who succumb to injury simply because they do not receive requisite medical treatment during the golden hour. We, therefore, direct the Central Government to make a scheme in terms of Sub-Section (2) of Section 162 of the MV Act as expeditiously as possible and, in any event, by 14th March 2025. No further time shall be granted.

We must also look into the implementation of directions contained in the order dated 12th January 2024. The learned counsel appearing for the applicant in IA No. 71387 of 2023 has placed on record the data of hit and run scheme up to 31st August 2024. The data shows that between 1st April 2024 and 31st August 2024, 1662 claimants received compensation under the scheme, but 1026 claims remain pending.

(This extract is taken from S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India & Ors., Writ Petition (C) No. 295 of 2012)

41. What fundamental right is most directly invoked and reinforced by the Court in requiring the Central Government to frame a scheme under Section 162 of the Motor Vehicles Act?

A. Article 14 – Right to Equality

B. Article 19 – Freedom of Movement

C. Article 21 – Right to Life and Personal Liberty

D. Article 32 – Right to Constitutional Remedies

42. As per the judgment, by when is the Central Government mandated to frame the scheme for cashless golden hour treatment?

A. Before 1st April 2022

B. On or before 31st August 2024

C. On or before 21st March 2025

D. On or before 14th March 2025

43. Which of the following correctly characterizes the legal effect of the Court’s directive to the Central Government in this judgment?

A. It is advisory in nature and not binding.

B. It constitutes a suo motu modification of the Motor Vehicles Act.

C. It imposes a time-bound statutory obligation enforceable under Article 21.

D. It constitutes a recommendation to amend Section 162 of the MV Act.

44. According to the judgment, what is the principal legislative intent behind enacting Section 162 of the Motor Vehicles Act?

A. To reimburse hospital bills of insured persons.

B. To create a national health insurance programme.

C. To ensure cashless treatment during the golden hour to prevent death.

D. To decentralise insurance regulation to the states.

45. What inference can be drawn from the Court's observation that “no further time shall be granted”?

A. The government has already notified the final scheme.

B. The Court is imposing a mandatory and non-extendable deadline.

C. The Court is expressing judicial restraint.

D. The scheme has been implemented in all Union Territories.

X. In light of the aforesaid judgment, as the appellants have successfully qualified the suitability test, they could not have been deprived of their legitimate right of promotion only on account of lower placement in the merit list. At this juncture, it has been brought to the notice of this Court that the appellants have been subsequently promoted and the issue now remains in respect of their seniority alone. In view of the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Ravikumar Dhansukhlal Maheta and Another (supra), the appellants are certainly entitled for promotion from the same date the other officers from the select list prepared by the High Court of Jharkhand have been appointed to the post of District Judge in terms of notification dated 30.05.2019.

Resultantly, the Civil Appeal is allowed and the orders passed by the High Court of Jharkhand is set aside. The appellants shall be entitled for notional promotion from the date other officers have been promoted to the post of District Judge in terms of notification dated 30.05.2019. They shall also be entitled for all consequential service benefits, including, seniority, increments, notional pay fixation etc., however, they shall not be entitled for any back wages.

(This extract is taken from Dharmendra Kumar Singh & Ors. v. The Hon’ble High Court of Jharkhand & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 299 of 2025)

46. According to the Supreme Court in Dharmendra Kumar Singh, once a judicial officer qualifies the suitability test under the 65% quota, which of the following is NOT a valid reason to deny promotion?

A. Failure to obtain top rank in the merit list

B. Pending disciplinary proceedings

C. Below-threshold ACR remarks

D. Non-availability of a vacancy

47. What relief was granted to the appellants in terms of service benefits?

A. Notional promotion, back wages, and reinstatement

B. Notional promotion with consequential benefits excluding back wages

C. Notional promotion, seniority, and back wages

D. Promotion only from the date of filing writ petition

48. Which of the following best describes the legal flaw challenged by the appellants regarding their non-promotion?

A. The rules did not permit any promotions without a written test

B. The High Court wrongly applied the limited competitive exam quota

C. The High Court prepared a merit list and promoted juniors over seniors despite all being suitable

D. The appellants were rejected for lack of ACR records

49. The Jharkhand Superior Judicial Services (Recruitment) Rules, 2001 were interpreted in conjunction with which constitutional provision on appointment of District Judges?

A. Article 235

B. Article 227

C. Article 233

D. Article 311

50. According to the decision in Ravikumar Dhansukhlal Maheta (2024), as applied in this case, the Court held that preparing a merit list after suitability tests in the 65% promotion quota would:

A. Be valid only with prior executive approval

B. Be mandatory under All India Judges’ Association (3)

C. Convert the 65% quota into a competitive examination, contrary to law

D. Be irrelevant as all candidates were equally placed

XI. The High Court’s focus on the date of registration as determinative of the applicable legal regime under Section 48(1) of the Act overlooks the accrued right crystallizing at the time of execution of the Cancellation Deed. Further, its refusal to disturb the recall of the earlier refund order, despite acknowledging the absence of statutory review power, is difficult to sustain. Participation in an erroneous procedure cannot, in our considered view, confer review jurisdiction upon the CCRA where none exists in law.

For the reasons discussed, we conclude that the Appellants are entitled to the benefit of the unamended proviso of Section 48(1) of the Act. Their refund application, therefore, cannot be repelled as time-barred merely because the deed’s registration was post-amendment. Equally, the subsequent orders recalling the already sanctioned refund stand vitiated, given the CCRA’s lack of statutory mandate to review its own final orders.

(This extract is taken from Harshit Harish Jain & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2025 INSC 104)

51. What principle did the Supreme Court affirm regarding retrospective application of limitation provisions in fiscal statutes?

A. Retrospective application is valid if expressly stated

B. A shorter limitation period cannot extinguish vested rights

C. Limitation laws are always substantive and never procedural

D. Fiscal laws do not recognize accrued rights

52. In the context of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, when did the Supreme Court determine the right to refund accrues?

A. On the date of registration of the cancellation deed

B. On the date the application for refund is filed

C. On the date the cancellation deed is executed

D. On the date the original agreement was signed

53. Which precedent did the Supreme Court rely on to hold that procedural amendments reducing limitation periods cannot extinguish vested claims?

A. Union of India v. Harnam Singh

B. Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.

C. M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise

D. All of the above

54. What broader fiscal principle did the Court invoke when stating that the State should not unjustly enrich itself?

A. Doctrine of estoppel

B. Public trust doctrine

C. Equity and fairness in fiscal statutes

D. Doctrine of severability

55. According to the judgment, what was the key flaw in the High Court’s interpretation of Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958?

A. It applied the two-year limitation instead of the six-month window

B. It failed to consider the execution date as the point of accrual of refund right

C. It treated the cancellation as void

D. It ignored the registration of the rectification deed

XII. Even with the aid of presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act, it is difficult to say that the accused persons abetted the commission of suicide. It is possible that the deceased might have felt bad because the first wife came back to the matrimonial home and being hyper sensitive might have taken the extreme step to commit suicide.

Before we close this matter, we deem it necessary to explain one very important aspect of the procedural law so far as it relates to proving the contents of the First Information Report through the Investigating Officer. In other words, if the first informant has passed away before stepping into the witness box, then whether the contents of such First Information Report can be proved through the evidence of the Investigating Officer and read into the evidence.

Another important thing is that for an F.I.R. lodged by a deceased person to be treated as substantial, its contents must be proved. It has to be corroborated and proved for there to be any value of the same in the case. The F.I.R. can be used by the defence to impeach the credit of the person who lodged the F.I.R. under Section 154(3) of the Evidence Act.

(This extract is taken from Lalita v. Vishwanath & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 1086 of 2017)

56. What is the key jurisprudential distinction between Section 113A and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872?

A. Section 113A deals with murder, while 113B deals with suicide

B. Section 113A provides discretionary presumption, whereas 113B mandates a conclusive presumption

C. Section 113A applies only to civil proceedings

D. Section 113A and 113B provide identical presumptions with interchangeable application

57. According to the Supreme Court in this case, under what condition can a First Information Report (FIR) be treated as substantive evidence?

A. When it is registered by a police officer

B. When the original informant cannot be found

C. When the informant dies and the death has a nexus with the FIR content

D. When the investigating officer testifies to its contents

58. Which of the following is true about the change introduced by Section 117 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023?

A. It removes the 7-year limit for suicide

B. It introduces an irrebuttable presumption

C. It re-enacts Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act without substantive change

D. It applies only to unmarried women

59. Which of the following best explains the burden of proof once the presumption under Section 113A is invoked?

A. The prosecution no longer needs to prove abetment

B. The accused must disprove guilt beyond reasonable doubt

C. The accused must rebut the presumption by preponderance of probabilities

D. The accused must prove innocence by producing an alibi

60. Can the Investigating Officer (IO) depose the contents of the FIR if the informant dies a natural death unrelated to the incident?

A. Yes, under Section 67 of the Evidence Act

B. No, unless the informant’s death was caused by the accused

C. Yes, if permitted by the Trial Court

D. No, because FIR contents cannot be proved through IO in such cases

XIII. At the heart of the dispute is the interpretation of one paragraph and its implication for the entire Master Circular. Paragraph 1.1.2(ii), reads thus:

(ii) If pre-shipment advances are not adjusted by submission of export documents within [360]¹ days from the date of advance, the advances will cease to qualify for prescribed rate of interest for export credit to the exporter ab initio.

HDFC Bank argued that even a single day’s delay in submission of export documents—irrespective of whether exports occurred and proceeds were realized within the permissible 450-day window—meant the credit would never be classified as 'export credit' from the start. As such, the benefits of the Interest Subvention Scheme stood forfeited.

The Court rejected this extreme interpretation. It held that such a rigid reading defeats the object of the Master Circular, which is to promote Indian exports through competitively-priced short-term working capital. The judges emphasized a purposive, contextual interpretation over a narrow literal one. They noted that export documents serve as evidence of actual exports—so if exports were effected within 450 days, a minor delay in documentation should not disqualify the advance from being ‘export credit.’

Further, the Court observed:

“We are unable to agree with such an extreme and absolute proposition that is patently and manifestly unreasonable and therefore arbitrary… The requirement to provide export documents is aimed at proving that exports indeed materialised within 360 [450] days… The provision of such documents within 360 [450] days is therefore a directory requirement and not a mandatory requirement.”

The Court upheld the Petitioner’s claim with respect to the “First Lot” (exports within 450 days but late document submission) and denied relief for the “Second Lot” (exports not made within 450 days), underscoring the essence of timely performance.

(This extract is taken from Jindal Cocoa LLP & Ors. v. Reserve Bank of India & Ors., Writ Petition (L) No. 8980 of 2024.)

61. According to the Bombay High Court in Jindal Cocoa LLP, what is the primary objective of RBI’s Master Circular on Export Credit?

A. To ensure all banks recover loans within 360 days

B. To provide exporters with long-term financing at concessional rates

C. To enable short-term, competitively priced working capital for exporters

D. To penalise exporters who default on documentation requirements

62. What interpretation of Paragraph 1.1.2(ii) of the Master Circular was adopted by HDFC Bank?

A. Export documents can be submitted anytime, as long as exports occur within 450 days

B. Export documents must be submitted within 450 days, failing which advances are not "export credit" from inception

C. Exports must only be promised; actual shipment is not essential

D. Exporters must pay the penal interest regardless of document submission timelines

63. How did the Court characterize the requirement of submitting export documents within 450 days?

A. A strict and non-negotiable statutory mandate

B. A procedural requirement, but mandatory nonetheless

C. A directory requirement subject to compliance with export performance

D. A redundant clause without legal significance

64. Which legal interpretation method did the Court reject in favour of a more purposive approach?

A. Mischief Rule

B. Golden Rule

C. Literal Rule

D. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius

65. Why did the Court not accept the Petitioners' claim for the Second Lot of export orders?

A. Because the export documents were never submitted

B. Because the exports never materialised within the stipulated 450-day period

C. Because HDFC Bank denied disbursal of the loans

D. Because the RBI refused to reimburse the bank

XIV. The act of outraging a female’s modesty is increasing exponentially thereby taking a toll on the lives of women leading to mental and physical agony. The word `modesty’ has to be judged as a quality or state of being modest, which is characterised by humility, restraint, simplicity, and good taste. The act of outraging the modesty of a woman refers to the virtue that attaches to a female owing to her gender and is an attribute associated with females in general. It is a sense of shame or bashfulness that a woman feels when faced with any act that is intended to outrage her modesty. To put it differently, modesty to a woman has evolved as altogether a different concept which has very little to do with the physique of the woman. The modesty of a woman is intimately connected with femininity including her sex. Modesty is not only limited to physical modesty but it also includes moral and psychological modesty. The moral modesty of a woman is said to be the sense of shame or bashfulness that a woman feels when faced with any act that is intended to outrage her modesty. The psychological modesty of a woman is said to be her innate sense of self-respect and dignity. Thus the modesty of a woman is sublime and any sort of intrusion or intercession is to be dealt with resolutely and soberly.

(This extract is taken from Biju Abraham & Varghese George v. State of Kerala, 2025:KER:7186)

66. According to the judgment, how is the concept of "modesty" of a woman legally and socially interpreted?

A. As a purely physical attribute relating to clothing and exposure

B. As a multidimensional concept involving physical, moral, and psychological aspects

C. As an outdated cultural value no longer relevant in law

D. As a concept that varies depending on the woman’s social status

67. What principle underlies the court’s justification for not requiring "plurality of witnesses"?

A. A single, reliable testimony is legally sufficient to convict

B. Video evidence is mandatory to support oral testimony

C. The accused’s testimony must also be presented

D. All prosecution witnesses must be independent

68. Which of the following statements best reflects the court’s view on societal responsibility in cases of outraging a woman’s modesty?

A. Society should counsel women to avoid unsafe environments

B. Society should treat such acts as minor misdemeanours

C. Society must adopt a zero-tolerance approach toward such offences

D. Society should leave justice solely to police action

69. Which provision of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 corresponds to the offence of outraging the modesty of a woman?

A. Section 69

B. Section 74

C. Section 75

D. Section 81

70. The judgment describes "modesty" as a concept that has "very little to do with the physique of the woman." What does this imply legally?

A. The victim’s attire or physical build is irrelevant to establishing the offence

B. The accused can raise a defence based on the woman’s appearance

C. Physical attractiveness is a necessary factor in modesty-based offences

D. Only verbal acts can outrage modesty

XV. Despite the severity of the offence, an argument was advanced before this Court that, since the accused is a woman, and wife of the victim, who was being tortured by him, she should be treated with leniency and as a victim though no explanation was forthcoming even during the course of arguments about the conduct of the accused.

The argument as above, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, bring forth, gender biases, whether hidden, conscious, or unconscious, which are an undeniable reality and not a mere fiction of the mind. Such biases – rooted in societal perceptions, cultural conditioning, or individual assumptions – often find their way into arguments advanced before the Courts, where leniency is sought solely on the basis of the accused's gender. However, it is the duty of the judiciary to remain vigilant and ensure that decisions are not influenced by such biases where law or judicial precedents specifically do not so provide.

The jurisprudence surrounding the grant of bail is guided by well-established principles, including the nature of injuries caused, the conduct of the accused, and the circumstances under which life-threatening injuries are inflicted. These principles, however, do not differentiate or lay down different rules for consideration, solely based on the gender of the victim or the accused. Further, the injuries caused to the body – whether of a man or a woman – cannot be categorized differently based on gender.

The pain, trauma, and damage resulting from such injuries are the same, irrespective of the victim's gender. The criminal jurisprudence in India, particularly in cases of life-threatening injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, is gender-neutral, as reflected in the term “whoever does any act” under the penal law. Therefore, it would amount to perversity of justice if, in cases where a woman causes such grievous injuries to a man, she is treated with leniency solely on account of her gender, despite the seriousness of the offence.

While dealing with this argument, this Court wonders that in case the roles were reversed, and had the husband poured boiling water mixed with chilli powder on his wife while she was asleep, would have locked her inside the room, after doing so, would have taken her phone and had fled away from the spot, leaving their infant child crying beside her, it would have been undoubtedly argued that no mercy should be shown to him. However, the Courts cannot let hidden or apparent biases guide them while deciding cases even when arguments full of hidden biases are presented before them.

(This extract is taken from Jyoti @ Kittu v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), BAIL APPLN. 262/2025)

71. Which of the following best captures the Court’s stance regarding gender neutrality in criminal jurisprudence?

A. Gender should play a decisive role in determining the severity of punishment.

B. Men deserve less sympathy because of systemic power.

C. Criminal jurisprudence must remain gender-neutral irrespective of the victim or perpetrator’s sex.

D. Women should be treated leniently in all cases involving domestic disputes.

72. According to the Court, what constitutes a “perversity of justice”?

A. Denial of bail to women in all cases.

B. Gender-based categorisation of injuries.

C. Grant of anticipatory bail to a woman only because of her status as a mother.

D. Lack of detailed arguments from counsel.

73. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the phrase “whoever does any act” signifies:

A. That all offences attract strict liability without exception.

B. That only male offenders can be held liable for serious offences.

C. That criminal liability varies based on the gender of the accused.

D. That penal provisions are applied in a gender-neutral manner.

74. Which of the following arguments did the Court explicitly reject as a basis for granting anticipatory bail?

A. The accused’s lack of prior convictions.

B. The accused is a woman and the victim's wife.

C. The accused is cooperating with the investigation.

D. The accused’s medical history.

75. What was the modus operandi alleged against Jyoti in the incident?

A. Poisoning her husband’s food.

B. Slapping and verbally abusing him in public.

C. Pouring boiling water mixed with red chilli powder on him while he was asleep.

D. Filing a false dowry case against him.

XVI. Though in both cases i.e. judicial custody or executive detention, the petitioner faces deprivation of her liberty, the nature of deprivation of liberty is different and distinct. In the first case, namely her custody for prosecution under section 14 of the Foreigners Act and under section 174-A of the IPC by a criminal court, the petitioner is in the custody of the court, namely ‘judicial custody’ or jail, as it is known in common parlance.

On the other hand, the imminent risk of the petitioner being detained at a detention centre/restriction centre arises from the powers vested in the Central Government (acting through the FRRO) under section 3 of the Foreigners Act, which provision authorises the Central Government to issue directions even with respect to a particular foreigner, prohibiting or regulating or restricting their entry or departure or continued presence in India. Such detention is quite self-evidently not a judicial function performed by the Central Government but a purely executive act…

…Bail proceedings relate only to the release of a person from ‘judicial custody’ and cannot be employed to seek release from ‘executive detention’.

(This extract is taken from Aizaz Kilicheva @ Aziza @ Maya v. State NCT of Delhi, BAIL APPLN. 1872/2024)

76. What principle did the Court uphold regarding the distinction between types of custody for foreign nationals?

A. All forms of custody must be approved by a Magistrate.

B. Judicial and executive detentions are the same in substance.

C. Judicial custody is distinct from executive detention under sovereign authority.

D. Executive detention must follow a bail order automatically.

77. Under the Foreigners Act, 1946, which section allows the Central Government to regulate a foreigner's continued presence in India?

A. Section 14

B. Section 174-A IPC

C. Section 14-A

D. Section 3

78. The Court refused to direct the FRRO to issue a visa to the petitioner because:

A. FRRO was not a party to the case.

B. The petitioner’s visa was already renewed.

C. Issuance of visa falls under executive discretion, not judicial authority.

D. The petitioner had committed a non-bailable offence.

79. The Court's opinion on releasing the petitioner from judicial custody was primarily based on:

A. Her claim of false implication.

B. Lack of a valid passport.

C. Completion of investigation and time already spent in custody.

D. Pressure from the Uzbekistani Embassy.

80. Which of the following best describes the Court’s holding on the scope of a bail petition?

A. It includes determining the validity of the visa or passport.

B. It extends to prohibiting future detention by the FRRO.

C. It only deals with release from judicial custody.

D. It requires the Court to monitor immigration status continuously.

XVII. The relationship between a father and son is one of the most profound bonds in human life. Caring for one's father is an inherent moral duty that stems from love, gratitude, and respect. Throughout his life, a father provides for his children, sacrificing his comforts and dreams to ensure their well-being. When he becomes old and dependent, it is only fair and just that the son reciprocates this care. However, as time passes and the father ages, the roles reverse, and it becomes the son's duty to care for and support his father in his later years. Just as a father once cared for his son, it is only fair that the son reciprocates when his father is old and in need. This responsibility is not only a moral and ethical obligation but also a legal duty. Society thrives when its elderly are treated with dignity and care. Neglecting an aged father not only leads to emotional distress but also weakens the very fabric of society.

(This extract is taken from Unneen v. Shoukathali & Ors., RPFC No. 29 of 2024)

81. Which of the following statements best reflects the Court’s view regarding the son's obligation to support his father?

A. Sons may support parents out of choice but have no legal obligation.

B. Sons are legally and morally obligated to maintain their aged parents.

C. Only moral obligation exists unless the father proves complete destitution.

D. Religious principles alone guide support for parents.

82. The principle “Pitru Devo Bhava” as cited in the judgment relates to:

A. Father as a deity in Buddhist philosophy.

B. Biblical principle of honouring parents.

C. Vedic injunction equating father to God in Hindu tradition.

D. Constitutional principle under Article 25.

83. According to the judgment in Unneen v. Shoukathali & Ors., which of the following legal provisions impose a duty on a son to maintain his aged father?

A. Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India

B. Sections 18 and 19 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 only

C. Section 125 of the CrPC (now Section 144 of the BNSS, 2023) and Section 4 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007

D. Section 144 of the BNSS, 2023 and Article 23 of the Constitution of India

84. What constitutional provision did the Court cite as supporting the duty to maintain parents?

A. Article 32

B. Article 21

C. Article 51A

D. Article 226

85. Under Section 20(1) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, a Hindu is bound to maintain:

A. Only legitimate children and aged parents.

B. Only sons and widowed mothers.

C. Legitimate or illegitimate children and aged or infirm parents.

D. Only male children and biological mothers.

XVIII. It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.

(This extract is taken from Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, as quoted in Abdul Nassar v. State of Kerala (2025), Criminal Appeal Nos. 1122–1123 of 2018.)

86. Which of the following is not one of the five "golden principles" of circumstantial evidence laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda and applied in Abdul Nassar v. State of Kerala?

A. The circumstances must be fully established.

B. There must be at least one direct witness to the crime.

C. The facts established should only be consistent with guilt.

D. The chain of circumstances must exclude every hypothesis except guilt.

87. In Abdul Nassar v. State of Kerala, what was the Court’s primary criticism of the lower courts' analysis?

A. They relied entirely on DNA evidence.

B. They failed to apply the benefit of doubt.

C. They did not adequately explain how the circumstantial chain proved guilt.

D. They ignored the accused’s alibi.

88. In the context of the case, which of the following was not a circumstance contributing to the accused’s conviction?

A. Recovery of the child’s clothes with seminal stains linked to the accused.

B. CCTV footage showing the accused committing the act.

C. Testimonies of relatives and neighbours placing suspicion on the accused.

D. Forensic DNA evidence matching stains found on the child’s skirt and the accused's samples.

89. Which landmark case was primarily relied upon to lay down the test for circumstantial evidence in Abdul Nassar v. State of Kerala?

A. State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh

B. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab

C. Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra

D. Pawan Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh

90. The doctrine of "five golden principles" in circumstantial evidence is popularly known as—

A. Nyaya Panchayat

B. Panchsheel

C. Triveni Test

D. Triple Test

XIX. We are all domiciled in the territory of India. We are all residents of India. Our common bond as citizens and residents of one country gives us the right not only to choose our residence anywhere in India, but also gives us the right to carry on trade & business or a profession anywhere in India. It also gives us the right to seek admission in educational institutions across India. The benefit of ‘reservation’ in educational institutions including medical colleges to those who reside in a particular State can be given to a certain degree only in MBBS courses, for which we have assigned reasons in the preceding paragraphs. But considering the importance of specialist doctors’ in PG Medical Course, reservation at the higher level on the basis of ‘residence’ would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This has been explained with pronounced clarity both in Jagadish Saran and Pradeep Jain. If such a reservation is permitted then it would be an invasion on the fundamental rights of several students, who are being treated unequally simply for the reasons that they belong to a different State in the Union! This would be a violation of the equality clause in Article 14 of the Constitution and would amount to a denial of equality before the law.

We make it clear though that our declaration of impermissibility of residence-based reservation in PG Medical courses will not affect such reservations already granted, and students are undergoing PG courses or have already passed out in the present case, from Government Medical College, Chandigarh.

(This extract is taken from Dr. Tanvi Behl v. Shrey Goel & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 9289 of 2019)

91. Which two earlier Supreme Court judgments were primarily relied upon in this case to strike down residence-based reservations?

A. Indra Sawhney and Ashoka Kumar Thakur

B. T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Inamdar

C. Jagadish Saran and Pradeep Jain

D. Saurabh Chaudri and Nandini Sundar

92. Which of the following best explains the term "domicile" as clarified in the judgment?

A. A legal concept denoting national identity in India

B. The state of permanent employment

C. The city where a person currently resides

D. The village or taluka a person is born in

93. What is the primary reason cited by the Court for disallowing residence-based reservations in PG medical courses?

A. It reduces the employment chances of local students

B. It promotes competition at the local level

C. It violates equality and treats non-residents unfairly

D. It is allowed only for economically weaker sections

94. As per the judgment, what does Article 14 of the Indian Constitution guarantee?

A. Equality before law and equal protection of law to all persons

B. Equal protection of laws to Indian citizens only

C. Equal treatment to residents of a State

D. Equal opportunity in employment only

95. Which Article permits Parliament—but not State legislatures—to prescribe residence as a condition for public employment?

A. Article 14

B. Article 15

C. Article 16(3)

D. Article 19(1)(g)

XX. We lastly address the final issue framed by us in these appeals, which pertains to the rights, protections, and privileges (or lack thereof) accorded to domestic workers in the Indian milieu. While this broader issue may only be tangential to the present appeals, we have taken it upon ourselves to deal with the same in light of the gravity and nature of the systemic issues we have been presented with.

It is an incontrovertible fact that the demand for domestic workers has been mounting in India, in consonance with rapid urbanization and development. According to reports by the International Labour Organisation (ILO)—which is a United Nations agency devoted to promoting internationally recognized labour and human rights—domestic workers currently constitute a significant portion of the unorganised workforce in India, with millions of individuals, primarily women, engaged in this sector. Their contributions are indispensable to urban households, performing tasks such as cooking, cleaning, caregiving, and other essential services.

While any avenues for employment being opened to marginalised women merit celebration, we are at pains to note that despite their growing demand, this indispensable workforce has also been the most vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. Domestic workers often belong to marginalised communities, such as Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes, and Economically Weaker Sections. They are compelled to undertake domestic work due to financial hardship or displacement, further reinforcing their vulnerability. That is not to say, however, that we are declaiming this source of gainful employment that is readily available to women across all social sub-stratas. On the contrary, we seek to affirm this important livelihood that is available to so many women, which brings them one step closer to financial security and the accompanying independence.

Amidst this backdrop, which motions the lack of specific protections covering domestic workers in India, it becomes this Court’s solemn duty and responsibility to intervene, exercise the doctrine of parens patriae and forge the path leading to their proper welfare. In a catena of decisions, this Court has repeatedly stepped in and laid down interim guidelines to protect vulnerable groups who were utterly unprotected due to legal gaps. That being said, we do not presently deem it appropriate to lay down an interim legal code which would govern the working conditions of domestic workers. We say so, being cognizant of the factum that ordinarily, the judiciary should not stray too far out of bounds, and expressly interfere in the legislative domain.

The democratic setup of this country may be likened to a tripartite machine, fueled by the doctrine of separation of powers, without which its functioning shall surely come to a grinding halt.

(This extract is taken from Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, Criminal Appeal No. 441 of 2025)

96. What metaphor did the Court use to describe the Indian democratic system and its interdependence?

A. An ecosystem of rights.

B. A wheel of justice.

C. A tripartite machine.

D. A fortress of freedoms.

97. Which doctrine did the Supreme Court invoke to justify its concern for domestic workers' rights in the absence of existing law?

A. Doctrine of Eclipse

B. Doctrine of Basic Structure

C. Doctrine of Parens Patriae

D. Doctrine of Severability

98. What directive did the Court issue under Article 142 of the Constitution in the context of domestic workers’ rights?

A. Directed the enactment of a central legislation within 3 months.

B. Directed the Government to constitute a committee to consider a legal framework.

C. Formed an expert committee under the Supreme Court’s supervision.

D. Ordered state governments to register all placement agencies.

99. Which of the following international conventions is most directly aimed at protecting domestic workers?

A. ILO Convention No. 87

B. ILO Convention No. 189

C. ILO Convention No. 111

D. ILO Convention No. 100

100. What key observation did the Court make about the gender composition of the domestic worker workforce?

A. The majority are children.

B. The majority are migrant men.

C. The majority are women.

D. The majority are unskilled youth.

XXI. Weighing the totality of circumstances and having regard to the legal principles discussed above, we are of the view that while the crime is heinous and deserves the highest degree of condemnation, it does not meet the threshold of “the rarest of rare” so as to irrevocably foreclose the option of life imprisonment.

This Court, while exercising its appellate jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, possesses the authority to scrutinize not only the conviction of an accused but also the appropriateness of the sentence imposed. As articulated in the principles laid down in Swamy Shraddananda, the power to impose or modify a sentence within the prescribed framework of the Penal Code is exclusively vested in the High Court and this Court. The alternate punishment for offences punishable by death, such as imprisonment for a specific term exceeding 14 years or until the natural life of the convict, remains within the judicial conscience of this Court and the High Court. This ensures that the gravity of the offence, the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and the possibility of reformation are thoroughly assessed before irrevocable sentences such as capital punishment are affirmed.

In the result, while confirming the conviction of the Appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC, we consider it appropriate to commute the death sentence to one of life imprisonment till his last breath.

(This extract is taken from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Deen Dayal Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 INSC 111)

101. What was the final sentence imposed on Deen Dayal Tiwari by the Supreme Court?

A. Death penalty

B. Life imprisonment with a possibility of remission after 14 years

C. Life imprisonment till the end of his natural life

D. Rigorous imprisonment for 25 years without remission

102. Which precedent was primarily relied upon to justify commutation from death to life imprisonment in this case?

A. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab

B. Sangeet v. State of Haryana

C. State of U.P. v. Krishna Master

D. Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka

103. The phrase “rarest of rare” was deemed inapplicable in this case. What was not a reason cited by the Court for this conclusion?

A. The Appellant’s satisfactory prison conduct

B. Lack of criminal antecedents

C. Victims were adult strangers

D. Possibility of reformation

104. Article 136 of the Constitution of India empowers the Supreme Court to:

A. Review decisions of all civil courts only

B. Exercise special leave jurisdiction over any judgment or order of any court or tribunal

C. Interfere only in criminal matters

D. Grant ordinary appellate jurisdiction in High Court cases

105. Which of the following best explains the term culpable homicide under the IPC and BNS?

A. All homicides are murders

B. All murders are culpable homicide, but not vice versa

C. Culpable homicide and murder are identical

D. Culpable homicide is always non-bailable

XXII. This we say so because the scope of the appeal before the High Court was limited to examining the correctness of the order of the Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai declining condonation of delay. Only when the delay is condoned, the merits of the order could be examined by the Appellate Court.

We may also put on record that before the Appellate Tribunal, the appellants had disputed that the order dated 23.07.2019 was based on consent of the parties. In these circumstances, when merits of the orders impugned in the appeal was not touched upon by the Appellate Tribunal, the High Court ought not to have commented on the merits.

For the reasons above, these appeals are allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court dated 23.08.2023 passed in Second Appeal Nos.475 and 188 of 2023 is set aside. The order dated 01.12.2022 passed by the Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai, refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeals by the appellants herein against the orders dated 23.07.2019 and 16.10.2019, is set aside. The delay in filing those appeals is condoned. Those appeals shall stand restored on the file of the Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai.

(This extract is taken from Surendra G. Shankar & Anr. v. Esque Finamark Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 928–929 of 2025)

106. According to the Supreme Court, which error did the High Court commit while deciding the second appeals?

A. It refused to hear the parties on merits

B. It entertained fresh evidence

C. It made observations on the merits despite limited jurisdiction

D. It failed to apply principles of natural justice

107. Which legal principle is most clearly reinforced by this passage?

A. Doctrine of merger

B. Appellate jurisdiction is procedural until delay is condoned

C. Limitation overrides equity

D. Consent decrees are binding in all circumstances

108. What was the central issue before the Supreme Court in the appeals arising from the High Court’s judgment?

A. Validity of the RERA orders on merits

B. Condonation of delay by the Appellate Tribunal

C. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 136

D. Whether the project was legally registered under RERA

109. In the passage, how did the appellants challenge the basis of the 23.07.2019 order?

A. They argued the order was ultra vires

B. They alleged the advocate gave unauthorised consent

C. They claimed the RERA had no jurisdiction

D. They questioned the registration status of the project

110. What was the ultimate direction given by the Supreme Court in the matter?

A. To remand the case to RERA for fresh adjudication

B. To initiate disciplinary action against the advocate

C. To restore the appeals before the Appellate Tribunal for decision on merits

D. To quash the entire complaint as non-maintainable

On a more careful perusal of the provision, it can be seen that Order II Rule 2(1) reads as - “every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action”, whereas the words used in Order II Rule 2(3) are “the same cause of action”. Despite being so, the words “the cause of action” used in Order II Rule 2(1) must be read to mean “the particular cause of action”. Only on such a reading one can arrive at the inference that where there are different causes of action, Order II Rule 2 will not apply; and where the causes of action are the same, the bar imposed by Order II Rule 2 may apply.

Order II Rule 2(1) requires every suit to include the whole of the claim to which the plaintiff is entitled to in respect of a particular cause of action. However, the plaintiff has an option to relinquish any part of his claim for the purpose of bringing the suit within the jurisdiction of any court. Order II Rule 2(2) contemplates a situation where a plaintiff omits to sue or intentionally relinquishes any portion of the claim which he is entitled to make. If the plaintiff so acts, then he shall not, afterwards, sue for the part or portion of the claim that has been omitted or relinquished.

(This extract is taken from Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. M/s Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd. & Anr., 2025 INSC 73)

111. What is the core objective of Order II Rule 2 of the CPC?

A. To limit the number of reliefs granted in a suit.

B. To give courts the power to deny reliefs retrospectively.

C. To avoid multiplicity of suits and splitting of claims or remedies.

D. To protect defendants from frivolous appeals.

112. Which interpretive approach did the Court adopt to differentiate between “the cause of action” in Rule 2(1) and “the same cause of action” in Rule 2(3)?

A. Literal

B. Purposive

C. Golden

D. Mischief

113. Why did the Court interpret the words “the cause of action” in Order II Rule 2(1) as “the particular cause of action”?

A. To expand the jurisdiction of trial courts.

B. To differentiate it from multiple unrelated suits.

C. To restrict the rule only to large commercial disputes.

D. To ensure that different causes of action do not invite the bar under Order II Rule 2.

114. Under Order II Rule 2(3), what does the plaintiff require to file a second suit for omitted relief?

A. Permission of the High Court.

B. No objection from the defendant.

C. Leave of the court in the first suit.

D. Certified affidavit from both parties.

115. Which of the following statements is true about “cause of action” according to the judgment?

A. It includes the defence set up by the defendant.

B. It depends solely on the character of the relief.

C. It includes every legal argument made in court.

D. It comprises facts necessary for the Plaintiff to obtain judgment.

XXIV. In Parveen Mehta vs. Inderjit Mehta, this Court held that mental cruelty is a state of mind and feeling of one of the spouses due to the behavioural pattern by the other and, unlike physical cruelty, mental cruelty is difficult to establish by direct evidence... In a case of mental cruelty, it would not be the correct approach to take an instance of misbehaviour in isolation and then pose the question whether such behaviour is sufficient by itself to cause mental cruelty. The approach should be to take the cumulative effect of the facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence on record and then draw a fair inference whether the spouse has been subjected to mental cruelty... Applying this standard, Dinesh’s conduct in completely ignoring his wife, Reena, after she suffered the miscarriage of their child would have been the proverbial last straw adding to her suffering due to the ill-treatment in her matrimonial home. She, therefore, had just cause to not return to her matrimonial home, despite the restitution decree.

116. Assertion (A): A single act of cruelty by a husband is always enough to justify a wife’s refusal to return to the matrimonial home.

Reason (R): The Supreme Court in Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta held that mental cruelty should be evaluated based on the cumulative effect of conduct.

A. Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A.

B. Both A and R are true, but R is not the correct explanation of A.

C. A is false, but R is true.

D. A is true, but R is false.

117. Assertion (A): Reena’s refusal to comply with the decree for restitution of conjugal rights was deemed unjustified by the Supreme Court.

Reason (R): Dinesh made no genuine attempts to reconcile and failed to address her grievances post-miscarriage.

A. Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A.

B. A is false, but R is true.

C. A is true, but R is false.

D. Both A and R are false.

118. Match the following judicial precedents mentioned in the judgment with their correct legal principles:

Options:

A. a-i, b-ii, c-iii, d-iv

B. a-ii, b-i, c-iv, d-iii

C. a-iii, b-iv, c-i, d-ii

D. a-iv, b-iii, c-ii, d-i

119. Which of the following provisions under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 corresponds to Section 125 of the CrPC, 1973?

A. Section 142 BNSS

B. Section 136 BNSS

C. Section 144 BNSS

D. Section 133 BNSS

120. Which of the following best reflects the legislative intent behind maintenance provisions?

A. Enforcing cohabitation in matrimonial homes

B. Preventing multiplicity of civil litigation

C. Providing socio-economic protection to dependents

D. Empowering husbands to avoid alimony litigation

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