This case reiterates the high evidentiary standard required to establish abetment to suicide under Section 306 IPC (Section 108, BNS).

The case of Lalita v. Vishwanath & Ors., decided by the Supreme Court of India on January 30, 2025, concerns an appeal filed by the mother of the deceased against the acquittal of the accused persons by the High Court. The case involves allegations of abetment to suicide and cruelty under Sections 306 and 498A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The appeal challenges the judgment of the High Court of Bombay, Aurangabad Bench, which had overturned the conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court.

Factual Background

The deceased, Dev Kanya, was married to Vishwanath (Respondent No.1) for approximately one and a half years before the incident. The appellant, the deceased's mother, alleged that her daughter was subjected to persistent harassment by her husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law, and her husband’s first wife, leading to her suicide.

A First Information Report (FIR) was lodged by the deceased’s father, which led to an investigation. The police recorded statements from multiple witnesses, and an inquest panchnama was conducted. The post-mortem report confirmed that the cause of death was drowning, indicating that the deceased had committed suicide by jumping into a well. The collected evidence, including clothing and forensic reports, was analyzed by the Forensic Science Laboratory.

Upon completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed, and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The case was registered as Sessions Case No.12/2012. The Trial Court framed charges, to which all accused persons pleaded not guilty.

Trial Court Proceedings

The prosecution presented multiple witnesses, including family members, medical experts, and investigating officers. Documentary evidence was also produced, including sale deeds, mutation entries, complaints, forensic reports, and the deceased’s affidavit and consent deed.

Upon evaluation of the evidence, the Trial Court convicted all four accused persons under Sections 306, 498A read with Section 34 of the IPC. The accused were sentenced to ten years of rigorous imprisonment along with a fine of Rs.1,000 each.

High Court Proceedings

Dissatisfied with the conviction, the accused persons filed a criminal appeal before the High Court. The High Court re-evaluated the evidence and overturned the Trial Court’s conviction, acquitting all accused persons. The High Court held that there was insufficient evidence to establish abetment to suicide and that mere harassment or cruelty was not enough to prove abetment.

The State chose not to challenge the acquittal, but the deceased’s mother, the appellant, approached the Supreme Court seeking a reversal of the High Court’s judgment.

Issues Before the Supreme Court

  • Whether the High Court erred in acquitting the accused persons despite the Trial Court’s findings of harassment and cruelty.
  • Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish abetment to suicide under Section 306 IPC.
  • Whether the contents of the FIR, filed by the deceased’s father who passed away before trial, could be proved through the Investigating Officer under Section 67 of the Indian Evidence Act.

The applicability of Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act (Section 117 of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam), which presumes abetment of suicide in cases of cruelty against a married woman.

Supreme Court’s Observations and Analysis

1. Insufficient Evidence to Prove Abetment to Suicide

The Court emphasized that mere harassment or cruelty is insufficient to infer abetment under Section 306 IPC. There must be concrete evidence demonstrating that the accused instigated, aided, or played an active role in the deceased’s suicide. The Court found no cogent evidence suggesting that the accused persons directly abetted the suicide.

The Court noted that the possibility of pressure from the husband to transfer land back to him existed. However, such pressure alone was insufficient to conclude that the deceased was left with no alternative but to commit suicide. The Court ruled that the allegations did not meet the threshold for abetment.

2. Applicability of Section 113A of the Evidence Act

The appellant relied on Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, which allows the Court to presume abetment of suicide if a woman commits suicide within seven years of marriage due to cruelty.

The Court referred to Ram Pyarey v. State of Uttar Pradesh (Criminal Appeal No. 1408 of 2015), where it was held that mere presumption under Section 113A is insufficient. There must be credible evidence of harassment or cruelty leading to the suicide. Since no substantial evidence suggested direct abetment, the presumption under Section 113A could not be invoked in this case.

3. Admissibility of FIR as Substantive Evidence

A significant issue in the case was whether the contents of the FIR could be proved through the Investigating Officer since the informant (the deceased’s father) had passed away before trial. The Trial Court had allowed the Investigating Officer to prove the FIR’s contents under Section 67 of the Evidence Act, which the Supreme Court found erroneous.

The Court reaffirmed that the FIR is only meant to set the criminal law into motion and is not substantive evidence unless it qualifies under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act (Section 26 of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam) as a dying declaration.

Referring to Damodar Prasad v. State of U.P. [(1975) 3 SCC 851], the Court clarified that an FIR can be treated as a dying declaration only if the informant dies due to injuries related to the case. Since the informant (father) died of natural causes unrelated to the case, the FIR could not be admitted as substantive evidence through the Investigating Officer.

4. Judicial Precedents on FIR Admissibility

The Court referred to Harkirat Singh v. State of Punjab [(1997) 11 SCC 215], which held that FIR contents could only be used for corroboration or contradiction under Sections 145 and 157 of the Evidence Act, not as substantive evidence. Similarly, in Hazarilal v. State (Delhi Administration), [(1980) 2 SCC 390], it was held that statements in an FIR cannot be treated as substantive evidence unless they fall under Section 32.

The Court also cited Umrao Singh v. State of M.P. [1961 Criminal L.J. 270], which differentiated between proving the fact of an FIR’s existence versus using its contents as substantive evidence.

Final Verdict

The Supreme Court found no legal error in the High Court’s acquittal of the accused persons. It held that:

  • The prosecution failed to establish abetment to suicide beyond reasonable doubt.
  • Mere allegations of harassment were insufficient to convict the accused under Section 306 IPC.
  • The presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act could not be applied due to a lack of credible evidence.
  • The Trial Court’s reliance on the FIR’s contents as substantive evidence was erroneous.
  • Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court’s judgment acquitting the accused.

Conclusion

The judgment underscores that while Section 113A allows a presumption of abetment in certain cases, it does not absolve the prosecution from proving cruelty and direct involvement in the suicide. Additionally, the decision clarifies the limited evidentiary value of FIRs when the informant is unavailable for testimony. The ruling affirms the principle that criminal convictions must be based on clear and substantive evidence, not mere allegations or presumptions.

Click Here to Read the Official Judgment

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Arjun Mehta

Arjun Mehta

Arjun Mehta is a legal scholar and author specializing in Criminal Law. A graduate of Banaras Hindu University (BHU), he brings academic rigor and practical insights to his writing. Through his works, Mehta illuminates the complexities of criminal jurisprudence, making legal concepts accessible to both practitioners and general readers. His contributions have established him as a respected voice in criminal law discourse.

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